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Abstract
The notion of trust has become a major factor in today’s networked world. While security is widely
recognized as an important aspect of public networked systems, the actions of individual participants is
often neglected. Even though the need of trust management is taken into account, there is no universal
solution as to what algorithms to use for calculating trust, nor is there any universal representation. In this
paper, we propose a novel approach to managing trust by making an analogy between physical matter and
abstract trust. We show that this alternative way of reasoning is feasible by proposing a framework based
on metrics such as trust mass, volume and density, inspired by the corresponding concepts in physics. Our
framework also provides for an intuitive means of representing trust graphically.
Keywords: Trust Metrics, Trust Fusion, Mathematical Models, Analogies.
1 Introduction
Along with the emergence of widespread electronic communications in large-scale
computer networks, the problem of malicious or otherwise undesired behaviour
among participants has grown into a major problem. The parties involved are often
unknown to each other beforehand, and in many cases communication takes place
on a temporary basis. Especially in business or otherwise sensitive communication,
precaution is crucial in order to avoid fraud, identity theft, or other undesired activ-
ities. In light of this, the notion of trust has become an important indicator of which
parties are benevolent vs malevolent.
There are several ways to gather trust ”raw data”, or reports, and distribute the
information among the parties involved in communication. For example, reports can
be divided into categories such as personal, trusted and public opinions, based of the
origin on the opinions in question [4]. Exactly what method is used depends on the
type of network in question, as well as what properties are emphasized in a particular
scenario. For example, gathering data about peer behaviour in a mobile ad hoc
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network may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the corresponding process in a network where
a central server node is present. In addition to the process of gathering information
about participants, the reports must in one way or another be interpreted in order to
draw conclusions, or in other words, to calculate the actual trust metric. While the
gathering of information is a ﬁeld of research in its own right, so is the calculation
of the trust metric based on the reported raw data, or report metric as it will be
referred to in the subsequent sections. There is no universal agreement on what
is the ”best” trust metric. However, various kinds of metrics are used in practice,
for example in online auction systems [1]. Trust metrics have also been studied
theoretically, both from a general point of view [2] as well as in speciﬁc scenarios,
such as attack-resistant trust metrics in public key certiﬁcation [3].
1.1 On the nature of our approach
As the title suggests, this paper is about the process of reasoning about trust, i.e.
calculating a trust metric from the raw data, in contrast to the process of collecting
it. We also do not take a stand on the propagation techniques which might be needed
if our approach is employed for example in ad hoc networks, where no central node
is present. What we focus on is the interpretation of raw data, i.e. how to generate
a suitable trust metric from the reports received.
Our model is continuous, in the form we present it. For example, we accept
real values as input, we assume that time is continuous, and the resulting trust
metric is a real number. However, this should not be seen as if the model would
mandate a continuous treatment instead of a discrete one. As computers are discrete
machines, all implementations will in any case be discrete, at least at the lowest level
of abstraction. The model can also easily be translated into a discrete one, whereby
for example integrals are changed into sums. The presentation in this paper is,
however, of conceptual and mathematical nature, and as such, we feel that it is
appropriate to treat the model in a continuous manner.
Our approach is intended to be quite general in nature. As such, it is not ”locked”
to a speciﬁc scenario. Instead, we reason about the foundations of trust, and the
main contribution of this paper is to show the possibility of using concepts from
physics to describe the behaviour of trust. More speciﬁcally, we introduce quantities
such as mass, volume and density, which are normally used to describe properties
of matter in nature. While many other trust schemes have been proposed, they
are normally ”artiﬁcial” in the sense that they are invented for the sole purpose of
representing trust. While artiﬁcial approaches may be speciﬁcally tailored for their
purpose, we also consider it valuable to make analogies between diﬀerent phenomena,
or at least ﬁnd out in what cases it is possible to do so.
1.2 Layout of the paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce a number
of concepts that are fundamental to our approach. Section 2.1 presents the report
metric, which represents feedback about the test entity as given by the observers.
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In the following subsection, the concept of trust area is deﬁned by using the report
metric. Furthermore, in section 2.3 we deﬁne trust volume as an extension of the
trust area, by involving a height function. In section 3, we present aging of trust,
which is based on trust mass and density, which are introduced in 3.1. Section 4 is
concerned with various constraints on the parameters and functions of our approach,
so that the model behaves as desired. We present a number of soundness properties
that can be expected from a trust metric, and we show that our model fulﬁls them.
Finally, in section 5, we sum up what we have presented in the paper.
2 Fundamental metrics
2.1 Report metric
A quantity, which will be referred to as the report metric, is of fundamental import-
ance for the approach presented in this paper. It represents the level of trust in the
object in question as reported by one or several observer(s). The report metric is a
continuous and total function of time, rm = rm(t), deﬁned in an interval [0, tnow].
In the case of several observers, the metric is a function of the individual report
metrics, for example a mean value. In that case we calculate the combined trust
metric according to the following formula:
rm = rm(t) = rm1(t)+rm2(t)+...+rmn(t)
n
.
Alternative ways of combining trust metrics will be discussed in section 4.2.
2.2 Trust area
The trust base area (or simply trust area or trust base), A, is a quantity calculated
directly from the report metric. The trust area is a function, which is deﬁned in an
interval I = [0, tnow], and calculated as
AI =
∫
I
rm(t)dt.
The graphical interpretation is thus an area, which is bounded by the report metric
function. As the report metric is also allowed to be negative, the (sub)intervals of
I in which rm(t) < 0 imply a decrease in the total trust area. The trust base as
a whole may also be negative. An important observation is the fact that the trust
area is actually a measure of the total amount of trust over the interval. Intervals
with a high report metric contribute to the total trust base in a high degree, whereas
intervals of low report metric only add a little to it. Furthermore, negative intervals
decrease the trust base; a fact that corresponds well to the intuitive interpretation
of a trust metric.
2.3 Trust volume
By multiplying the trust base AI with a height, we calculate the volume, V , of a
three-dimensional body (see ﬁgure 1). It is, however, important to note that the
volume is also allowed to be negative, in which case the entity in question should
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Figure 1. Trust volume (constant height).
be seen as being more untrustworthy than trustworthy. The height, h, is intuitively
a value which ampliﬁes the trust base metric, so that a high height implies a large
volume. Similarly, a low height leads to a small volume, even though the trust base
may be the same. The formula for calculating this volume is:
VI = h ∗
∫
rm(t)dt.
The usefulness of this ampliﬁcation, and thus the whole notion of trust volume, may
not be evident unless we introduce a height which is variable in time: h = h(t),
deﬁned over the interval I. Extending the formula to include this scenario yields:
VI =
∫
I
h(t)rm(t)dt.
This extension increases the expressiveness of the concept of trust volume as com-
pared to the trust area, as diﬀerent periods of time may now be given diﬀerent
importance. At periods of time when reliability in the test subject is crucial, the
function h(t) may be given a larger value, resulting in a larger ampliﬁcation in the
trust volume. In this way, the implications of the report metrics during these periods
of time are given a higher impact. We also note that if using the constant function
1 as height function, the formula simply degrades to the one for trust area. Hence,
trust volume can also express everything that trust area can, and is thus superior
in terms of expressiveness.
3 Mass, density and decay
As the behaviour of people and other entities may change over time, it is often
reasonable to believe more in feedback reports given recently than those that have
been given at an earlier point in time. As the trust volume does not take this aspect
into consideration, it is evident that we need to introduce new concepts in order to
adapt the model to these facts. To achieve this goal, we will incorporate aging into
the model. However, before doing so, we have to present the notions of trust density
and trust mass.
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3.1 Density and mass
We ﬁrst consider the simple case where the trust density, denoted by ρ, is constant.
In this case, the density is simply a real value, and the trust mass, m, is calculated
as the product of the trust volume and the trust density, i.e. m = V ∗ ρ. However,
the usefulness of the concepts is not evident unless we allow the trust density to
vary over time as a (total) function ρ(t), where t ∈ I = [0, tnow]. The trust mass is,
in turn, deﬁned as:
mI =
∫
I
ρ(t)h(t)rm(t)dt.
This deﬁnition is also valid for the case of constant trust density, as that can simply
be seen as a special case of the variable version where ∀t ∈ I : ρ(t) = ρ (constant).
As a result of this fact, the formula for calculating the trust mass simply degrades
to the one mentioned above, as mI =
∫
I
ρ(t)h(t)rm(t)dt = ρ
∫
I
h(t)rm(t)dt = VI ∗ρ.
Trust mass degrades to trust volume if the density function is set to the constant
function 1. Hence, it can also express everything that trust volume can. This can
be compared to the reduction of trust volume to trust area by setting the height to
1, as stated in section 2.3.
3.2 Decay of trust
To achieve the eﬀect of trust aging, we use another analogy from physics, namely
radioactive decay. Still, it is important to stress that this analogy should not be
pushed too far. For example, radioactive nuclei decay into other elements and ra-
diation, whereas we consider the decayed trust to completely disappear. Another
way in which our concept diﬀers from physics is that we permit decay functions of
diﬀerent forms than the one that takes place in nature (and the trust function itself
is expressed in another fashion).
In our model, the idea of decay is intended to reduce trust density over time.
It is represented by a higher-order function, which takes the current time as input
and returns a speciﬁc density function such as presented in the previous subsection.
What is important to notice is that this function can be used to calculate the current
density of the trust mass generated at earlier points in time. However, this particular
function is only valid for the (current) time it was calculated for. In other words, at
each point in time, we can calculate a function that gives the current density of the
previously generated trust. In this way, we can achieve aging of trust by choosing the
decay function carefully. This process can easily be illustrated, as in ﬁgure 2, which
contains snapshots from an example scenario at time t=2 (left) and t=3 (right). In
the graph from t=2, the trust is still relatively fresh. The most recently generated
part is still black (high density), while the oldest one is a little greyish, representing
a slight decay. However, at time t=3, the oldest part has almost completely decayed,
and only the newly generated trust is still dense.
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Figure 2. Trust decay. Snapshot when time is 2 (left) and 3 (right). Gradient represents density.
4 Constraints on functions and parameters
In the preceding sections, several functions and parameters have been presented.
Many of these can be chosen by the person who sets up the system. They should,
however, be chosen carefully, as they have a large impact on the behaviour of the
model. The parameters and functions can be tailored to speciﬁc scenarios, taking
into account what is important in those speciﬁc cases. Even though they can be
chosen relatively freely, there are also certain values and functions that are not
acceptable, simply because they make the model behave in a counter-intuitive way,
or make the model unsound. The topic of this section is to pinpoint which choices
are appropriate and which are not. An overview is presented in table 1.
4.1 Constraints on the report metric
As the report metric is the quantity which provides input data to the model, the
process of calculating this quantity is not within the scope of this paper. Still, trust
metric values about the same entity, given by various observers, can be combined to
a single trust metric using a combination function. This matter will be discussed in
the following subsection, and was also shortly mentioned in section 2.1.
Despite the above statement, the model may put restrictions on the type of values
that are accepted as input. The model does not require us to accept only values
within a particular interval. However, it is important that the report metric, when
seen as a function of time, allows us to calculate a unique trust area value. This
implies that the integral in the trust area formula must not diverge. Based on well-
known integral calculus we can conclude that the integral will not diverge in case
the trust metric function itself does not do so. Hence, trust metric functions that
do not diverge are acceptable. However, we can not draw the reverse conclusion, i.e.
that if the report metric function diverges, the integral would also necessarily do so.
In theory, there are also report metric functions that do diverge, still resulting in a
well-deﬁned integral value. Still, for our model, we ﬁnd it hard to think of a diverging
report metric function which would actually make sense from a practical point of
view, when taking into consideration that it is supposed to represent feedback about
how entities are behaving. From this point of view, we ﬁnd it appropriate to restrict
the report metric function so that it is not allowed to diverge, even though some
other cases would also be applicable from a strictly mathematical point of view.
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Explanation Not. Formula Constraints
Report
metric
Input raw data,
or data calculated
using an rm
combination
function.
rm,
rm(t)
Raw input data,
or a function of
other rm’s. See
below.
The report
metric, if seen as
a function, should
not diverge.
Report
metric
combin-
ation
function
Function for
combining
individual report
metrics.
-
For example a
weighted mean
value: rm(t) =
c1 ∗ rm1(t) + ... +
cn ∗ rmn(t),where∑
n
i=1 cn = 1 and
ci > 0
Non-divergent.
Should be
somund in
practice, e.g. a
weighted mean
value.
Trust
area
A simple trust
metric.
A AI =
∫
I
rm(t)dt
(Not given as
input)
Height /
Height
function
Ampliﬁcation of
trust metric
reports in some
intervals.
h,
h(t)
Various functions
(however, see
restrictions).
Non-divergent,
typically
non-negative.
Trust
volume
A trust metric
based on trust
area and height.
V
VI =∫
I
h(t)rm(t)dt
(Not given as
input)
Trust
density
Speciﬁes the
density of trust.
Useful for aging.
ρ
If aging is
applied, gener.
by decay fun.
(see below). If
not, various fun.
(see constr.).
Non-divergent,
typically
non-negative and
growing.
Trust
mass
A trust metric
based on trust
volume and trust
density.
m
mI =∫
I
ρ(t)h(t)rm(t)dt
(Not given as
input)
Decay
function
Generates density
functions. Useful
for aging.
-
Various.
However, see
restrictions.
See section 4.3
Table 1
Functions, parameters (and metrics), as well as constraints on them.
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4.2 Choosing a report metric combination function
In section 2.1, we suggested that individual report metrics can be combined by
calculating a mean value. However, other functions are possible as well. Many kinds
of functions would be plausible from a mathematical perspective, but they should
also be sound in practice. A mathematical constraint is that the function must not
diverge, and practical constraints involve the fact that the resulting report metric
should somehow represent the reports given as input values. Not excluding other
possible function, we suggest using a linear combination of the individual report
metrics, i.e.:
rm(t) = c1 ∗ rm1(t) + c2 ∗ rm2(t) + ... + cn ∗ rmn(t).
The constants, ci, should typically be positive, so that each individual report in-
creases the sum if it is positive and decreases it when a negative report is given.
Depending on the nature of the scenario in question, one may prefer constraining
the constants so that
∑
n
i=1 cn = 1, whereby the linear combination degrades to a
weighted mean value. Furthermore, if ﬁxing the weights to equal values, the result
will be normal mean value, as we suggested earlier.
4.3 Constraints on the height, density and decay functions
The height function, h(t), is present in the formula for calculating trust volume and
mass, the latter also containing the density function ρ(t). By reasoning in a similar
way as when constraining the report metric (in 4.1), we do not wish the products
h(t)rm(t) (in the volume formula) or ρ(t)h(t)rm(t) (in the mass formula) to diverge.
This can be achieved by limiting both h(t) and ρ(t) to non-divergent functions.
Mathematically, the height function could also generate negative values, but as
this would imply that positive feedback decreases the amount of trust, and vice
versa, most scenarios probably require it to be non-negative. A similar reasoning
also applies to the density function, as negative density introduces strange behaviour.
Thus, the density function should typically be non-negative. The density function
being zero in some intervals might, however, be useful. Also the height function
being zero at intervals might come into question, as that would simply imply that
the intervals in question are not be taken into consideration when calculating the
trust metric.
When deciding density functions, there is one more property that ought to be
stressed, especially when density is used to express aging. If the intention is to
give new trust a high density, whereas older trust should be less dense, the density
function should be growing. The decay function should also, in this case, be chosen
in such a way that the a more recently generated density function never attributes a
higher density value to a speciﬁc piece of trust than a previous function has. That is,
if ρ2(t) is a more recently generated density function than ρ1(t), then ρ1(t) ≥ ρ2(t)
should apply for all values of t. Even though this rule is reasonable in most cases,
we do not claim that it is a universal rule, or that there would be no exotic scenarios
where density grows or older pieces of trust should be given more importance than
newer ones.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a number of trust metrics, sharing a common
property: they are inspired by their corresponding entities in physics. Our model
behaves intuitively, provided that certain restrictions are posed on the parameter
values and functions. We pinpoint what restrictions are needed, and for what reas-
ons, from a soundness point of view. Apart for those speciﬁc values, we allow a large
number of parameters, so that the model can be adapted to the speciﬁc scenarios.
This property can be helpful when adapting the model for use in concrete scenarios.
An overview of the concepts, as well as the way they are related to each other, is
presented in table 2. We also note that trust mass is the most powerful of the con-
cepts presented, and can express all the properties of trust volume, which in turn
has all the capabilities of trust area. The two last mentioned concepts are, however,
important from a theoretical point of view, as they are used to build up the theory
involved in trust mass. Thinking of trust as physical matter also provides convenient
ways of expressing trust graphically, as shown by the various graphs in the paper.
Provides
Data
required
Concepts
required
Report metric
Only
feedback
raw data
Input from
observer(s)
-
Trust area
A simple
notion of
trust
Report
metric
Integral
Trust volume
Same as
trust area
+ Support
for variable
ampliﬁca-
tion
Trust area
& a height
function
Integral
Trust mass
Same as
trust
volume +
Support for
trust aging
Trust
volume & a
decay
function
Trust
density,
trust decay
Table 2
The central concepts of the paper, and how they are related.
One of the most important contributions is, however, that we have shown that it
is possible to make an analogy between the properties of physical matter and those
of abstract trust. While we consider this property valuable in itself, we also believe
that by creating a basic framework, further analogies can in the future be used to
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incorporate new concepts into the modelling of trust.
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